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Abstract
Mimesis has held a central role in art making since ancient times as a primary
means of apprehending the real. This exegesis is an explication of the various
mimetic functions that have endured in modern and contemporary art practises
such as the readymade and its sculptural simulation. I consider key works by
Andy Warhol, Marcel Duchamp, John Cage and Peter Fischli and David Weiss,
examining their relationship to the concept and practise of mimesis. I address
mimetic representation and replication in dialogue with philosophers such as
Arthur Danto, Gorgio Agamben, Jean Baudrillard, Maurice Blanchot and Jennifer
Anna Gosetti-Ferencei. This research asks if there is a fundamental difference
between the mimetic activity in ancient Greek statuary and in modern and
contemporary art practise through an exploration of the connections between
trompe l’oeil and the quotidian as reciprocal and interdependent. Additionally, the
exegesis seeks to clarify the complex relationship between formal philosophical
thought and the operations of creative labour, highlighting points of intersection
and divergence between two distinct modes of ‘thinking’. This distinction
positions philosophical thought within mentally constructed concepts and artistic
thought within mentally constructed images. The discussion provides a setting for
my studio practise and brings into question the process of mimetic replication as a
necessary additional step in the production of my work following the initial
creation of a sculptural assemblage. In both activities—the configuration of found
objects and the casting of their copies—I have discovered that the sculpture’s
conceptual effect is echoed in the physical enactment of its fabrication. This
exegesis is therefore an elucidation of my studio process, where the concerted acts
of seeing, configuring and manufacturing retrieve representational sculptural
objects from nothingness.

1

Acknowledgments
I acknowledge the support of my supervisors: Ian McLean, Susan Ballard, Lucas
Ihlein and Brogan Bunt.

2

Certification
I, Hany Armanious, declare that this thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the conferral of the degree Doctor of Creative Arts, from the
University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or
acknowledged. This document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other
academic institution.

Hany Armanious
28 March 2021

3

Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 1
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. 2
Certification ...................................................................................................................... 3
Table of Contents............................................................................................................... 4
Chapter 1 .......................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 2 ......................................................................................................................... 11
Beginnings ............................................................................................................... 11
Danto’s Warhol ........................................................................................................ 12
Withholding ............................................................................................................. 19
Work ........................................................................................................................ 21
Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 24
Painter of Dirt .......................................................................................................... 24
Mr Big ...................................................................................................................... 26
Ready-made ............................................................................................................. 30
Nowhere ................................................................................................................... 34
Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 38
Minemata ................................................................................................................. 38
Moths ....................................................................................................................... 40
Simulated Readymades ............................................................................................ 42
Things ...................................................................................................................... 47
Image ....................................................................................................................... 48
Voiding .................................................................................................................... 51
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 54
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 54
List of References ........................................................................................................... 57

4

Chapter 1
Introduction
According to Carl Jung, ideas constantly recur, persistently holding and
challenging us to engage. Such a set of persistent ideas—around mimesis,
representation and replication—have helped signpost and direct the research that
comprises this exegesis. In the recounting of certain episodes within my studio
labour, a key concern repeatedly surfaces: my reliance on the found object and its
subsequent facsimile as a central artmaking strategy. Here is something so
obvious and as ancient as representation itself, that I might have ignored and
overlooked it if not for its niggling persistence. Once possessed by this set of
ideas, I wrote, in an attempt to scratch this phantom itch, or to at least illuminate
it. Throughout this exegesis, I converse with a range of critics and theorists, who
offer ways to reconsider the relationship between mimesis and my own art
practice. Running parallel to this academic conversation, I discuss some artists—
Andy Warhol, Marcel Duchamp, John Cage, and Peter Fischli and David Weiss—
that have, until now, held little interest for me. They serve as important examples
of art’s protracted tussle with representation and the ‘real’.
Chapter One begins with a consideration of Arthur Danto’s ongoing
intellectual engagement with Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box (1964), which sets up an
investigation into what I regard as the uneasy relationship between philosophy
and art. Danto states that “when philosophy first noticed art it was in connection
with the possibility of deception” (Danto 1983, p.1-2). This statement forms one
of several strands that my exegesis unravels: firstly, the idea that philosophy
follows art and not the other way around; and secondly, that philosophy notices
“the possibility of deception” (Danto 1983). Why “possibility”? Does this refer to
a latent potentiality or an ability to deceive that is not always activated? And as
for “deception”, this can only allude to the central issue of the mimetic function
in art. I set Danto’s position against Giorgio Agamben’s 2014 lecture ‘Resistance
in Art’, where art making is presented as a gesture of restraint and negation or,
what Agamben calls, “in-operativity” (2014). This can be partially understood as
a sabotage of the normal functions of a language or, rather, a system that results in
poetry. Although Agamben does not directly refer to mimesis, his notion of the
5

suspension and simultaneous accounting of the perceived object better conveys
the epiphany of the Brillo Box. Agamben’s proposition offers an alternative to
Danto’s eschatological reading of Warhol’s practice, where Danto’s theories
appear to lay claim to the creative act rather than provide a space for it. This is
especially true when Warhol’s art practice and Danto’s theory aligns so closely
that the individual agency of the artist appears compromised. Danto declares, “It
is the role of artistic theories, these days as always, to make the artworld, and art
possible” (1964, p. 581).
For Danto, Warhol’s art was deeply philosophical, and in ‘noticing this’,
Danto declared that art had reached its final physical manifestation before
dematerialising into pure idea. On the other hand, Agamben’s view is that due to
art’s refusal to comply with any paradigm of final resolution, it operates in a state
of “contemplation and im-potentiality” (2014). Contrasting these texts tests
specific theoretical models against my own experiences as a maker and observer,
which is perhaps more in keeping with Agamben’s embrace of indeterminacy
over resolution. This chapter is a conversation with and around the subject of
mimesis and the novel ways that artists such as Warhol and Duchamp embrace
mimetic representation.
Chapter Two puts Jean Baudrillard’s The Conspiracy of Art (2005) in dialogue
with my 1993 sculpture Mr. Big. Here, I recall my experiences in the ‘Aperto’
section of the 1993 Venice Biennale, and re-evaluate my time there considering
Baudrillard’s condemnation of much of the work in that exhibition. The chapter
explores notions of the quotidian, or the everyday, underscored by Baudrillard’s
views on nullity and waste, which helps me look more closely at my use of
discarded objects and detritus. As with Danto, Baudrillard singles out Warhol,
and to a lesser extent Duchamp, as the primary forces shaping Western art in the
twentieth century. Echoing Danto, Baudrillard also claims that Warhol has no
worthy successor. Baudrillard lashes out at contemporary art, disavowing it for
what he calls “the storming of reality”, invoking an all-encompassing artistic
strategy that potentially devours its subject by blurring the artificial with the real
(Baudrillard 2005, p.27). How Baudrillard differentiates the feats of verisimilitude
and simulation in contemporary art from those of Warhol and Duchamp is
initially unclear. Equally unclear is why he dramatically—and necessarily—
alludes to Warhol as art’s end. The chapter then moves to a discussion of John
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Cage’s 1952 composition 4’33”. The piece is an alternative approach to
simulation and the quotidian, as exemplified by Cage’s famous statement, “I have
nothing to say and I am saying it” (1961, p. 109). Cage’s approach to art
production, which includes working with randomly generated signals both aurally
and visually, grew from his interest in Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism and
the I Ching. Such an approach pre-empts Baudrillard’s rage and illustrates how an
artist could simply redirect a viewer’s attention to sensory data that might have
been overlooked, leaving little room for conceptualisation and pointing to a vast
field of perception that one can simply awaken to. Cage provides a glimpse at the
wonder of life as it really is, if only, as he puts it: “one gets one’s mind and one’s
desire out of its way, and lets it act of its own accord” (Cage 1961). This attitude,
perhaps mystically esoteric, is generally kept at a safe distance in academic
environments but brought into sharper focus in artistic ones. The difficulty of
bridging the two is analogous to dancing on the head of a pin.
Art and philosophy (and mysticism for that matter) all engage with the allusive
notion of being. Martin Heidegger speaks of the “pure beholding” that is at the
heart of being, and claims “beholding” as “the foundation of western philosophy”
(Heidegger 1962, p.215). It is here, in this “beholding”, that the relationship
between philosophy’s quest for ontological truth and art’s promise of “pure
perception” is negotiated, even redeemed. This relationship, between perception
and existence, or the perception of that which is immediately present, is key to
understanding how the ancient world regarded mimesis and how the mimetic
underscores creative labour across time.
Chapter Three begins with an overview of “The Classical Concept of Mimesis”
by Göran Sörbom (2002), who explains that for the Greeks of antiquity, mimesis
was regarded as a common human trait for apprehending and representing the
world, where the concept of ‘Fine Art’ did not exist. Minemata was how the
ancient Greeks referred to paintings, sculptures, poems or plays, and what Plato
called “man-made dreams produced for those who are awake” (Sophist 266C).
These productions were sequences of image impressions, with each stage of the
transmission being mimetic. First, the real object or event that creates a mental
image (mimemata) is recalled and then, it is reproduced in the desired way
(mimema). Both functions of apprehension and their retelling would constitute
what is now commonly referred to as ‘the arts’. Moreover, mimesis in antiquity
7

was most valued when it conveyed something of the inner life of its subject, even
at the cost of inaccurate or exaggerated renderings. This would suggest that the
“pure beholding” Heidegger (1962) speaks of, can be traced back to a time in
human history where the imitation of life was synonymous with not only the
affirmation of life, but more importantly, the cognisant recognition of one’s
immersion in life itself. Such activities were woven into the everyday social fabric
of ancient Greece, yet, as Sörbom points out: “The innovation of the 18th century
was to regard these explorations as goals in themselves (autotely) and to give
them an institutional place of their own in western society and culture (autonomy;
the artworld to use Arthur Danto’s modern term)” (2002, p. 20). If Sörbom’s
estimation is correct, then the institutionalisation of artistic endeavour in the
eighteenth century, where “the establishment of aesthetics became an intellectual
and academic pursuit” (2002, p. 20), was the point where Western art and
Western philosophy took to the dance floor. And if Danto is correct, then
philosophy asked for the first dance. However, the skill with which they move is
reliant on the music ‘being’ played in the background.
The development of the studio work that is part of this research was never a
clearly demarcated process of thinking and planning followed by action and
realisation. It is better described as an attempt to set aside aspiration and exertion
in favour of attending to whatever objects might be in front of me. Under these
conditions, the majority of the work, which is comprised of assemblages that look
like moths was conceived. Once the manipulation of found objects was complete,
the additional procedure of deliberation and difficult labour began. While in some
cases the ‘manipulation’ is simply an act of recognition without physical
modification, the objects are eventually reproduced and, in a sense, memorialised
in their casting as life-like replicants. Each step, whether tacit noticing or labourintensive material re/production, involves and arguably relies on a mimetic
manoeuvre.
In his essay ‘Simulated Ready-mades’ (1994), Boris Groys discusses the lifelike sculptures of Fischli and Weiss, proposing that the viewing of a classical
ready-made sculpture (e.g., Duchamp) requires an internal “spiritual
interpretation” in order to see the quotidian in a new light. This new light is
difficult to sustain due to the ever-present possibility of the object reverting to its
everyday value. But when the commonplace is simulated, as it is with Fischli and
8

Weiss (and also Warhol, Koons, Gober and many others), that possibility is
eliminated, and the object is permanently fixed in its incongruent ‘thingness’. The
thingness that is revealed by the facsimile object tells us more about the object
than the object itself. It is a hijacking of the object’s sight impression so that it
goes on to exist only as image. Both ‘thing’ and ‘image’ share similar qualities of
detachment from their previous lives, and as Maurice Blanchot puts it, show
themselves as “linked to the elemental strangeness and to the formless weight of
being, present in absence” (1982, p. 258). Blanchot elaborates on this sensation
through an extended contemplation of a corpse, proposing that a person’s visage
is always hidden until the arrival of death, which bears the true semblance or
image. This ‘Cadaverous Resemblance’ is echoed in Groys’ simulated
readymade, where one is no longer perplexed by a layered narrative but presented
instead with what Blanchot calls “pure image” (1982, p. 259).
It is odd that in a discussion of sculpture one is led to think about imagery and
surface appearance. Perhaps these sculptural practices are more aptly described as
the production (or removal) of façades and veneers. How then would sculptural
practices differ from the work of the master propmaker? In Sörbom’s ancient
Greece, there was no difference since there was no concept of Fine Art and all
such activities were mimetic. The modern answer could be that theatrical props
function in a subordinate role as background to the mimesis of the performance,
but the props on view in the art gallery are the central performance. The prop in
the gallery can be seen to function as an exposition of mimesis itself through
trompe l’oeil. Moreover, the prop in the art gallery is a device that entraps and
rehabilitates the peripheral, the overlooked or the unremarkable, where the
commonplace is illuminated and held in what Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
calls ecstasy.
Throughout each of the chapters are brief citations from Gosetti-Ferencei’s
chapter ‘Ecstatic Mimesis in Trompe L’oeil’, which has become a touchstone for
much of my thinking on the relationship between mimesis and the everyday. Her
2007 book The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art
and Literature, in which the chapter appears, explores modernism’s (at times,
unacknowledged) indebtedness to the phenomenological engagement with the
everyday. Gosetti-Ferencei’s incisive study has provided the necessary compass
to navigate what at first seemed like impossible speculation on the origins of
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creative work and brought back into focus the foundational instinct of imaginative
imitation through word, gesture, object and image.
Overall, this exegesis seeks to re-evaluate the significance of the mimetic
faculty as a way of articulating the comprehension of the real and the everyday.
These processes have been central to my work for a good part of my career and
are linked to practices both ancient and contemporary. Given the fundamental
nature of the mimetic urge, the subject has provoked much thought and discussion
within philosophical discourses. This research then, is firmly situated within such
discourse.
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Chapter 2
The work that is carried out in my studio often sits outside discursive experience
and demands a tacit awareness that is more visceral than intellectual. However, in
order to discuss my work, I have found a language that opens up the ideas which
up until now I had not fully articulated. In this first chapter, I consider the divide
that sometimes exists between practical studio work and speculative thinking as a
way to initiate an understanding of my work methods. The main texts discussed in
this chapter are Arthur Danto’s ‘Art, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Art’
(1983) and Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Resistance in Art’ (2014). Each offers starkly
contrasting views on creative labour; Danto claiming art, specifically Andy
Warhol’s, as intrinsically philosophical, and Agamben suggesting that the creative
act is one of resistance or “in-operation” of functional structures. Both approaches
also speak directly and indirectly to mimesis and shed light on the imitative as a
fundamental urge in art making. This is pertinent to my studio practise where
mimicry and facsimile have become the drivers of my sculptural explorations,
almost by default, and often without question. In this regard, and for the purposes
of this discussion, Warhol acts as a stand-in for my own practise whilst being a
case in point for Danto’s speculations on art’s relationship to philosophy.
Beginnings
I have undertaken the studio work for this research through a sequence of discrete
activities that engage existing objects. The initial steps involve the selection and
isolation of the objects I want to work with, which are often the discarded or
damaged material from my studio, workshop or home. This process is not
straightforward as it requires that the pieces come into my peripheral view rather
than being actively sought out. This is the tacit awareness mentioned above that
relies more on physical sensations and what I call ‘unresolved sentiments’ than on
any specific intellectual work. ‘Unresolved sentiments’ are the underlying
attitudes and feelings that aren’t enacted directly but which might surface in
response to certain objects when seen in a new way. This process invites an
engagement with scrap items, which are sometimes rendered imperceptible by
their very banality, in order to attain full recognition through an ancillary act of
awareness. This seeing is also aided by the obvious remaking and replication of
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the object, which broadens the scope of possible choice by emphasising that
virtually anything can be copied. In the beginnings of visceral response,
recognition and selection, a commitment is made through the appearance of an
object that I had not previously fully appreciated. The objects retrieved from
obscurity are placed together in a clear space and allowed time to provide clues on
what could happen next. This is a time of observation and rearranging, of trying to
balance one thing on top of another, or simply placing certain objects next to each
other to see how they relate. These simple and rather ‘dumb’ manipulations align
with the conventions of what is broadly called assemblage art. Some items might
remain mute for weeks or months until a slight shift in placement or the
introduction of another element suddenly transforms a simple object into an
engaging sculptural problem. This rudimentary arrangement of found material is
further refigured when it undergoes the process of mould making and casting,
where its constituent parts are realistically replicated in coloured resin. The
relationship of the found to the everyday, as exemplified in this replicative
process, evidences the interplay between mimesis and the quotidian, and is an
underlying question in this exegesis, which I will first explore through Danto’s
reading of Warhol.
Danto’s Warhol
In his essay titled ‘Art, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Art’ (1983), Arthur
Danto states that ‘aesthetics’ are of no interest to him as a philosophical thinker.
He cites John Passmore’s 1951 essay, ‘The Dreariness of Aesthetics’, to illustrate
the divide between the theory of art and the plethora of art practice. Passmore
denounces the dullness of formal aesthetics, pointing to its pretentiousness and the
way it was “peculiarly unilluminating” since it deals with the incomparably
interesting subject matter of art and beauty, but in ways which unintentionally
diminish art’s power (Battin cited in Passmore 1986, p. 11).
As a formally trained philosopher and painter, Danto had a passion for both art
and philosophy yet kept both instincts separate; he was unable or unwilling to
reconcile the two distinct modes of activity. He stated that he was never interested
in discussing art within the discipline of philosophy until he encountered Andy
Warhol’s Brillo Box in a New York gallery in 1964, recognising the work as
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fundamentally philosophical (Danto 1964). This moment was an awakening.
Realising the possibility of addressing current art within a philosophical
framework through a chance encounter with a deadpan facsimile of a massproduced object, Danto embarked on a life-long career in art theory and criticism,
which ultimately included his much-discussed essay ‘The Artworld’ (1964).
Danto was already aware of the work of the Pop artists of his day and familiar
with much of Warhol’s work up to this point, but Brillo Box offered a significant
revelation. According to Danto:
… the Warhol show raised a question which was intoxicating and
immediately philosophical, namely why were his boxes works of art while
the almost indistinguishable utilitarian cartons were merely containers for
soap pads? Certainly, the minor observable differences could not ground as
grand a distinction as that between Art and Reality! (Danto 1983, pp.1-2).
Danto elaborates on this idea adding: “it cannot be forgotten that when philosophy
first noticed art it was in connection with the possibility of deception” (1983, p.
2). By “deception” it seems reasonable to assume that Danto is referring to
mimesis: the creation of a convincing likeness of a given thing. Theories of
mimesis can be traced back to the earliest philosophical concepts, namely Plato’s
theory of imitation. However, the motivation to imitate through image, word or
gesture, as a means to arrive at a specific outcome is evident well before this in
some of the earliest known art, such as the Chauvet cave paintings in southern
France. Why then does Danto understand the Brillo boxes as a radical shift given
that imitation is a dominant impulse in art across cultures and throughout human
history? If Danto claims that the imitative in art is an essentially philosophical
proposition, why then has this not always been so?
In the early 1960s, Warhol tried unsuccessfully for years to be accepted as a
serious artist in New York where he was already a well-established and highly
sought-after graphic designer (Andy Warhol: A Documentary 2006). Pop Art
gained momentum as a reaction to the dominant (and sanctioned) post-war
movement of abstract expressionism. Artists such as Jasper Johns, Robert
Rauschenberg and James Rosenquist dominated the scene with their depictions of
everyday, banal items and materials sourced from advertising and mass media.
However, their treatment of these subjects involved a painterly lyricism, which
was often limp and messy, owing much to the gestural painting of their
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predecessors such as Jackson Pollock or William De Kooning. Warhol finally
gained recognition when he consciously removed any sign of the artist’s hand in
his work, purposefully removing paint drips from his paintings. In a 1980
interview Warhol describes a studio conversation that led to his renouncing the
gestural mark:
At five o’clock one particular afternoon [probably in the summer of 1960]
the doorbell rang and De [Emile de Antonio] came in and sat down. I
poured scotch for us, and then I went over to where two paintings I’d done,
each about six feet high and three feet wide, were propped, facing the wall. I
turned them around and placed them side by side against the wall and then I
backed away to take a look at them myself. One of them was a Coke bottle
with abstract expressionist hash marks halfway up the side. The second one
was just a stark, outlined Coke bottle in black and white. I didn’t say a thing
to De. I didn’t have to—he knew what I wanted to know. ‘Well, look,
Andy,’ he said after staring at them for a couple of minutes, ‘One of these is
a piece of shit, simply a little bit of everything. The other is remarkable—
it’s our society, it’s who we are, it’s absolutely beautiful and naked, and you
ought to destroy the first one and show the other.’ That afternoon was an
important one for me (Warhol in Hackett 1980).
This conscious act of removing the mark of the artist’s hand within the artwork
and replacing it with an entirely mechanical and cold technique was what gave
Warhol a seat at the Pop table. After this initial breakthrough, he extended this
technique to print-, film- and sculpture-making, which ultimately gave rise to the
Brillo boxes. Ironically, the Brillo boxes today are often noted for their simple
construction and the tenderness of the brushwork and colour matching. In other
words, their warmth and hand-made qualities emphasise their materiality.
Contrary to the commonly held view that the shock of the Brillo boxes was their
realism, I propose that these objects were fairly rudimentary approximations of
their sources, even in their day. Rather, the performative act of creating these
works imbued them with their particular force and audacity. In this sense, the
selection of the referential subject and the process of its reproduction galvanises
the work’s physical presence beyond its material articulation.
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei addresses the subject matter of mimesis in
ancient and contemporary art in her book The Ecstatic Quotidian (2007):
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Though in radical ways announcing a new era in the history of art, heralding
postmodernism in art, it is not unimportant that the Brillo Box is, as an
ironic mimetic enactment, also prefigured by ancient forms of
rhyparography—the depiction of the common, vulgar, or insignificant—and
resonates with other post-Renaissance and modern forms of trompe l’oeil.
Affinities among these works, despite significant differences, suggest the
persistence of mimesis as a means to reflect upon phenomena, upon the
appearance of the everyday and its vulnerability to transformation (2007, p.
238).
The Roman philosopher Piny the Elder briefly discusses the work of a famed
painter of small pictures in ancient Greece called Peirakos. He was later named
Rhyparographos, which translates to ‘painter of dirt or low things’, due to his
choice of mundane or pedestrian subject matter. Though regarded as an inferior
painter by his peers, his small paintings were known to fetch higher prices than
the larger scale and thematically grandiose works of his contemporaries.
‘Rhyparography’ is now a term closely associated with mimesis and its cousin,
trompe l’oeil. Aristotle even speaks of “the animals we most despise whose
effigies please us the more exact they are” (Aristotle in Danto 1974, p. 15).
Leaving aside the question of the quotidian, various non-western traditions
understand the act of making a copy of a person or object as an intimate exchange
with supernatural forces, where the act is as sacred as the object itself.
Considering levels of fidelity and likeness alongside cultural significances around
creative acts, the question remains, what is the fundamental difference between an
ancient painted recreation of a life-like object and Warhol’s Brillo boxes? Or does
Danto simply understand the Warhol work as somehow radically conventional? I
direct this same question at my own sculptural work. Danto offers this
explanation in ‘The Art World’:
What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work of art
consisting of a Brillo box is a certain theory of Art. It is the theory that takes
it up into the world of art and keeps it from collapsing into the real
object...without the theory, one is unlikely to see it as art…To see something
as art requires something the eye cannot decry—an atmosphere of artistic
theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld (1964, p. 581).
In this essay, Danto sets out to define “the is of artistic identification” through an
15

extremely complex analysis of pairs of predicates and their opposites in a most
perplexing and opaque system of formal logic (1964, p. 577). This analytic
approach, which does little to bridge the chasm separating art practice from
philosophy with all its worthy and noble intentions, recalls Passmore’s
articulation of the dullness and hyperbole of formal aesthetics, to which Danto
here appears to fall prey. As perilous and discursive as it may seem, Danto
presents a carefully engineered bridge of sorts, pre-empting the question of why
and for whom:
The philosophical question about the nature of art, rather, was something
that arose within art when artists pressed against boundary after boundary
and found that the boundaries all gave way – if you were going to find out
what art was, you had to turn from sense experience to thought. You had, in
brief, to turn to philosophy (2014, p. 6).
Warhol’s Brillo Box was already doing its work as art with or without Danto’s
imposed theories (‘imposed’ because of Danto’s assertion that “without theory
one is unlikely to see it as art” [1983, p.1-2]). Here ‘theories’ can be extended, as
Danto proposes in this essay, to also mean the institutional framework or the
bracketing of art—what he names ‘the artworld’. Artifice demands that we
suspend our disbelief as if we are viewing a staged performance, with a collective
consensus that it is a play on reality, a make-believe. This make-believe is
sanctioned by the academy or museum—the artworld—which hosts and
disseminates whatever this illusion conveys. Perhaps it is when the play with
reality becomes difficult to distinguish from the real that the structures which
bracket the action become more necessary, even central to understanding the
artwork. This may be where, after pressing against boundaries to find out what art
is, one turns from sense experience to thought, or as Danto calls it, philosophy.
In making a convincing likeness, a degree of technical skill and craft is
required to fabricate the work. While ‘fabricate’ suggests construction or
production, it also denotes deception or lying. Thus, a fabrication can refer to a
building process as well as the perpetuation of a falsehood. Is this the ‘deception’
that Danto tells us philosophy first noticed in art, a deception that is somehow
ingrained in the act of art making? Similarly, the word ‘act’ can mean a definitive
or decisive gesture of agency, but also to pretend or to take the place of another.
Such etymological slippages reveal the depths of meaning in familiar concepts
16

and offer alternative ways of engaging with ideas and looking at art. ‘Reflection’
serves as another example, meaning both a mirroring as well as a state of deep
contemplation. Each of these seemingly simple words—fabricate, act and
reflect—exemplifies the mimetic principle of opposition, conveying notions of
both truth and falsehood, volition and submission, internal and external.
Danto is primarily concerned with what differentiates the imitation from the
original and points to contemporary institutions of academic thinking and
authority as the only means through which to verify this distinction. However,
Danto makes no attempt to consider how Warhol’s effigies differ from other
examples throughout art’s history and before his ‘artworld’. Following this logic
of verification, the effigies created by tribal cultures were framed by the magical
functions they served in a specific narrative, engendering their conceptual and
occult utility. Greek statuary represented the belief system and cosmic order
within a particular cultural framework and was therefore inseparable from its
theoretical and theological underpinnings. In each case there exists a kind of
theory that prevents the work from “collapsing into the real object” (Danto 1983,
p. 1-2). This would suggest that reflections on the nature of appearance, which
can be accepted as philosophical activity, predate the event Danto recognises in
the Brillo Box.
In 1981 Danto had a previous epiphany, deciding that with the Brillo Box the
history of art had come to an end, there was nothing more to be achieved and, as
he puts it, art had now become philosophy (1998 p.,134). “Andy had by nature, a
philosophical mind, he was really doing philosophy by doing the art that made
him famous”, Danto later wrote in his biography of Warhol (2009, p.135). Danto
never made clear what philosophy ‘Andy’ was doing (unless he assumed the
reader’s latent understanding of the philosophical context implicit in the process
of mimetic apprehension). Additionally, Danto fails to sufficiently recognise that
these same issues, philosophical or not, had been raised by Duchamp almost fifty
years earlier when he placed everyday objects into a gallery and consecrated them
as already-made art. Although Danto acknowledges Duchamp’s contribution, he
nimbly sidesteps the crucial factor of Warhol’s Brillo Box as an imitation not of
reality as he would have us think, but as the imitation of another’s art. The Brillo
Box was Warhol’s response to Duchamp’s ready-mades. By creating lifelike
replicas of readymade art objects, Warhol used art to ape art, revealing the
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potential function of mimesis as pastiche or commentary. Whilst Duchamp had
succeeded in dispensing entirely with imitation, through his use of the real,
Warhol wilfully and discreetly reversed this gesture, one more move in the game,
but by no means the final word (Menand 2010).
This brings us to the question of why I take the additional step of replication
after arriving at an interesting assemblage of readymade components. Is it an
elaboration on art aping art? After all, my work can easily be classified within the,
sometimes ignoble, genre of junk sculpture. Does reproducing it in plastic make it
any better, any smarter? Is its value enhanced through a material transformation?
These are questions I address in more detail in the following chapters but are
necessary to foreground here.
Warhol, with his carefully studied, dumbed-down rhetoric, had a deep and
thorough engagement with twentieth-century art and was in fact a savvy modern
art collector. He was involved to the point of obsession with the art and culture of
his era and would not have settled for the reading of his work as a mere re-staging
of a Dada strategy. The recent 2017 survey exhibition of Warhol’s graphic work
at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, Adman: Warhol before Pop, curated by
Nicholas Chambers, featured many sketch books and drawings made long before
his entry into the art world, that reveal a facility for figuration and sensitive line
drawing. The great number of drawings on view were clearly influenced by the
work of Henri Matisse and attested to Warhol’s abilities as a master draughtsman
as well as an artist highly attuned to mid-century humanist themes in European
figuration. One could easily mistake these early sketch books of Warhol with
those of Jean Cocteau or Pablo Picasso. Although the Warhol of Pop Art appears
to counter such romantic forays into idealised figuration, these sensitive studies
reveal a thorough understanding of graphic art canons, laying the groundwork for
his emergence as a Pop icon.
The great irony is that in Warhol’s final arrival at the pinnacle of Pop, his work
simultaneously challenged and reinforced dominant artworld ideas. In the case of
Brillo Box, Warhol conformed, in many ways, to Clement Greenberg’s modernist
discourse, which stringently rejected Pop Art, demanding that avant-garde art be
self-reflexive and explore its own formal possibilities, making its subject the
artwork itself (1939). This is precisely what Warhol achieved under the guise of
what Greenberg refers to as ‘kitsch’, which interrogates the very mechanisms of
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the mass image machine through the exploration of its own formal possibilities,
ultimately mirroring it back onto itself. Neither Greenberg’s Kantian exhortations
nor Danto’s end of art pronouncements could adequately contain Warhol’s total
immersion in the art of his time. The expansive nature of Warhol’s work, with its
relationship to both his culture and the practises of the distant past, was such that
certain theorists could choose to only address aspects of his work that were
relevant to their particular lines of inquiry and disregard the irrelevant facets of
his practise. As a result of this selective critical engagement with Warhol’s work,
the more subtle, and possibly more profound, qualities have been overshadowed
by the shocking glare of the Pop statement itself.
Withholding
Philosophy thinks with concepts, and art thinks with seeing. The word see not
only denotes vision but also understanding. I have recognised this difference in
the ways that I function as an artist, which does not involve any specific
intellectual work but demands a degree of mental equilibrium. This state of
resigned uncertainty is particularly important early in the development of a piece
when I am essentially working indiscriminately. That is, as noted at the beginning
of this chapter, without any specific aim other than to stay open to the regular
stuff around me. These critical first steps are more often than not taken outside the
studio when I’m going about my daily business, moving around, taking it all in.
Perhaps this experience is better described as the secession of thought in the face
of so much sensory data.
Having recently taken up full time work in an art school as a lecturer in
sculpture, I spend more time around students’ work than my own. Outside my
office is an external area where students carry out messy work that needs
ventilation and open space. Here I have come across a plethora of abandoned
projects in stone and wood, bits and pieces of steel and ceramic, discarded
polystyrene and cardboard, all with the traces of labour and effort gone wrong. I
began to collect these abandoned objects and brought them home to display on
my work bench and allow them to percolate. These were another order of found
objects that I had not previously considered utilising. I did not go looking for
these things nor was I pursuing the idea of recycling other people’s daubs, yet it
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made perfect sense to repurpose these partially formed attempts at fashioning as
raw material for new work. These objects are interesting not because they are
discarded sculptural exercises, but because they are unique objects generated by
forces outside of myself and which I had no hand in. By absolving myself of the
imperative of mark-making and reclaiming these raw gestures as authorless, I
retrieve the manipulated object’s intrinsic and simple significance without the
complication of its intended resolution. It is an exoneration of the object’s
seeming failure as well as a reprieve of my own disinclination to apply my hand.
Agamben elaborates on Aristotle’s assertion that “potentiality is essentially
defined by its possibility of not being exerted” (2014). Agamben proposes that
actuality is not the only outcome of potentiality, but another choice that is
inherent and entirely integral to potentiality. He calls this “intimate and
irreducible resistance to actuality”, “impotentiality” (2014). This non-creation or
potent ‘not doing’ is an inner resistance within the creative act that tempers the
blind drive of potentiality and is present in all great art:
The potentiality ‘not to’ is a resistance internal to potentiality which
impedes its exhaustion in the act and obliges potentiality to turn towards
itself and to become a potentiality that contains its own impotency…Great
poetry does not only say what it is saying but also speaks about the fact that
it is saying. Painting is the suspension and exposition of the potentiality of
the site just as poetry is the suspension and exposition of language
(Agamben 2014).
Agamben describes a restraint that brings about poetic forms, which results from
a subversion of the mechanisms of creative work, or rather, suspension as a means
of insight. In my case, the im-potentiality is twofold: firstly, the discovery of
unfinished sculptures by others that are re-presented as a new gesture is possibly a
sublimation of the urge to leave a mark, and secondly, the programmed simulation
of these objects without embellishment is an active silence. These acts of
withholding reveal something of the creative process itself, where restraint and
constraint can serve as vehicles for new expression. The withholding also speaks
directly to the mimetic principle in Warhol’s art, where he consciously quells all
claims of individual imagination in favour of a simulation of prefabricated
imagery and common merchandise. The mimetic act is in itself a denial and
resistance to the expectations of creative work in its subordination to the effect of
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realism. Warhol’s achievements become clearer when we recognise the subtlety
and strength of what he was not doing as perhaps a more fitting form of appraisal.
It is the potentiality of ‘not to’ which inscribes itself as ‘an inner mannerism in
every true artwork’ (Agamben 2014).
The mode of active disengagement, or a ‘poetics of in-operativity’, is helpful in
understanding much of Warhol’s output. We see this not only in the Brillo Box
but also in his early films such as Empire (1964) and Sleep (1963), in which a
long and single meditation on an unremarkable subject becomes charged through
the relentless unmoving gaze of the camera. The charge is brought about by the
viewer’s fluctuation between the poles of objectivity and subjectivity, empathy
and ambivalence: a surrender to ‘im-potentiality’.
Work
Franz Kafka’s short story ‘The Great Swimmer’ (1922) includes the acceptance
speech of an Olympic swimmer upon her homecoming. Her confession echoes
Agamben’s “in-operativity”:
Honoured guests! I have admittedly broken a world record. If, however, you
ask me how I have achieved this, I could not answer adequately. Actually, I
cannot even swim, I have always wanted to learn, but have never had the
opportunity (Kafka 1922).
How can the effort invested in the task of creative work be quantified? Certainly,
there is time spent acquiring the necessary skills needed to manipulate one’s
chosen medium be they visual or literal, but these are only the tools and means of
creative labour and not creativity itself. This is the point where art and philosophy
begin to diverge: when philosophy’s drive for quantification (and qualification)
demands that the immaterial labour of art become visible (or in academia,
measurable). The real paradox however is that although art’s incongruity is
generally accepted, one is forced to continually reiterate and expound on the same
conundrum in order to secure and maintain the trust of institutional power. The
conundrum is in the unspoken expectation that art engages with the ineffable or
irrational by whatever means - yet this engagement is then made subject to
empirical criteria.
Agamben approaches the central issue of artistic labour through the notion of
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‘work’, citing Aristotle’s questioning of the work of man. The answer is that the
human is born without work and the worklessness of humans forever remains a
potential state. Substituting the word ‘work’ with ‘purpose’ allows for a better
understanding of Aristotle’s inquiry. Aristotle was so disturbed by the idea of
humans as fundamentally without ergos (proper work) and therefore without the
possibility to be defined by work, that he quickly abandoned the discussion
(Aristotle in Agamben 2014). Agamben sees this active state of inoperativity as a
defining quality of humanness and the true domain of art, as well as the only type
of real work and available only to the poet:
Contemplation and in-operativity are the metaphysical agents of becoming
human…Freeing one of any social or biological testing or vocation opens
one to those peculiar forms of worklessness that we are accustomed to mean
art. The most appropriate paradigm for this operation, this activity which
seeks in making inoperative all human work is poetry itself. What is poetry
if not an inoperation in language on language that deactivates and renders
inoperative the usual communication and information functions of language
in order to open it to a new possible use? (2014).
Could not the same apply to Warhol’s deactivation or disabling of the vernacular,
exploiting images of celebrities or car accidents, where strategies from the virtual
to the shamelessly decorative unwittingly succeeded in defusing some of the
collective trauma of his time? By purposeful eradicating authorship or any other
recognisable material virtuosity in his work, as exemplified by the Brillo Box,
Warhol succeeds in “render[ing] inoperative the usual communication and
information functions of language”. By naming his studio ‘The Factory’, Warhol
knowingly plays with notions of labour and production thereby creating an arena
where another kind of work can take place. The work that Warhol carries out in
his Factory is not the manufacture (fabrication) of products we normally expect
from industry. Instead, the Factory was a site for subtle gestures of mirroring
(reflection) that disrupted or made inoperative the “usual communication
functions” (Agamben 2014). The Factory was, in a sense, a front for an enterprise,
which, although it embraced the idea of mass production and consumption,
actually engaged in a radical stasis or resistance to action that was combined with
a capitulation to prefabricated imagery as its primary mode of production.
Agamben’s view of the creative act as gaining power through the withholding of
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potentialities in a deliberate resistance to a final resolution speaks directly to
Warhol’s overall project, and more significantly to the mimetic in art making in
general. Is this then a point where art and philosophy actually meet on their own
terms? And what does this mean for Danto’s eschatology—that Warhol’s Brillo
Box is the point where art became philosophy and therefore the end of art?
.

23

Chapter 3
The previous chapter examined Agamben’s notion of the workless state as the true
domain of creative activity, where ‘doing’ is inverted as a resistant act of
potentiality. In this chapter, I expand this inversion and elucidate how such an
oxymoron can come to be - how ‘not doing’ becomes a more potent form of
doing. This oxymoron offers a particular lucidity, an impossibly light grip on an
undertaking that is utterly illusive yet palpably present, again evidencing the
relationship between the ‘everyday’ or the known and its transformation through
an act of mimetic apprehension. This slippery relationship, that encompasses a
sense of total acquiescence combined with conscious action, has been a spectre in
my studio since my early career. I will discuss this balance that exists between
artistic acts of volition and those of total submission as an underlying process in
the work of Warhol, Marcel Duchamp and John Cage in order to tangentially
explore my own studio work. I also provide an anecdotal account of my first
inclusion in a major international exhibition in 1993 to provide some background
on how I initially came to use waste material in my sculpture and why it is still an
important part of my practise. My primary point of reference is Jean Baudrillard’s
The Conspiracy of Art (2005), which offers a nuanced discussion on ‘nullity’ as a
quality both of degeneration and malaise in contemporary art on the one hand, and
also of artistic singularity and transcendence. Warhol and Duchamp figure
prominently amongst the collection of essays and interviews in The Conspiracy of
Art, as they do in Danto’s thesis, where they are put forward as critical figures in
contestable territories.
Painter of Dirt
As long as art was making use of its own disappearance and the disappearance of
its object, it still was a major enterprise. But art trying to recycle itself by storming
reality? The majority of contemporary art has attempted to do precisely that by
confiscating banality, waste and mediocrity as values and ideologies, raising
originality, banality and nullity to the level of values or even perverse aesthetic
pleasures. Of course, all of this mediocrity claims to transcend itself by moving art
to a second, ironic level. But it is just as empty and insignificant on the second
level as it is on the first level. The passage to the aesthetic level salvages nothing;
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on the contrary, it is mediocrity squared. It claims to be null - “ ‘I am null! I am
null!’ - and it truly is null “(Baudrillard 2004, p. 27).
Baudrillard proposes the ‘storming of reality’, calling for the manipulation and
movement of waste and banality to a higher aesthetic order. There is nothing
intrinsically banal or mediocre about ‘reality’ as such. To condemn contemporary
art for its ‘storming of reality’ would also condemn the very foundations of most
art making, past and present, Western and non-Western, for its interactions and
interpretations of the world, where the ‘storming’ or a concerted scrutiny of
perceived reality, is intrinsic to the labour of art. There are two possibilities here
that illustrate this elevation of waste: the use of detritus as subject and material in
art practice, and the simulation principle in art. By conflating these two ideas,
Baudrillard distorts ‘the storming of reality’ or the attempted reproduction, even
representation, of virtually any thing around us, as no different from picking over
garbage as a final and desperate act of futility.
Baudrillard does not address the long and intimate relationship that mimesis
has with the quotidian, which brings us back to Rhyparographos’s ‘painter of
dirt’, whose practise of rendering common subjects gained him greater recognition
than that of his ancient Greek counterparts’ faithful representations of loftier
narratives. Rhyparography has consequently been widely employed in the
language of much contemporary art and popular culture where depictions, be they
literary, visual and especially cinematic, require elements of everyday disorder,
the regular pulse of normalcy, to engage the viewer or audience in a deeper way.
Consider for example the ‘fly on the wall’ films of the Dardenne brothers or the
photographs of Jeff Wall or the sculptures of Isa Genzken, all of which display a
controlled informality verging on chaos as a primary aesthetic strategy.
Baudrillard’s objection to the vapid nullity he sees in contemporary art is a
critique of the quotidian in contemporary art (waste and mediocrity) and the
mimetic in contemporary art (the storming of reality) is similar to the derision
piled upon Rhyparographos by his contemporaries, who deemed his choice of
subject matter sordid and therefore undesirable.
The Conspiracy of Art was in large part written by Baudrillard as a reaction to
the 1993 Venice Biennale. In a 1996 interview with Ruth Scheps, Baudrillard
explains:
I remember saying to myself after the 1993 Venice Biennale that art is a
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conspiracy and even an “insider trading”: it encompasses an initiation into
nullity and, without being disdainful, you have to admit that everyone is
working on residue, waste, nothingness. Everyone makes claims on
banality, insignificance; no-one claims to be an artist anymore (Baudrillard
2005, p. 56).
This fallen state of the artist, Baudrillard argues, is the weakening of the
foundations of value where art engages in an orgy of surplus and excess. He
contrasts this view of contemporary art with what he describes as his belief in
‘form’:
…I don’t use form in the aesthetic sense. For me, form has nothing to do
with focusing positively on something, nothing to do with the presence of
the object. Form rather has to do with challenge, seduction, reversibility
(Baudrillard 2004, p. 84).
Mr Big
Rereading this essay for the first time since its initial publication in 1996, I was
suddenly reminded of my own experience of the 1993 Venice Biennale, where I
exhibited for the first time in an international context and in the context where
Baudrillard had partially formulated this critique. This same Venice Biennale
could also be a marker of the beginning of my professional career when, at the
age of 31, I was invited by the Venice Biennale director Achille Bonito Oliva to
participate in the Aperto section of the exhibition. The show, entitled
Emergency/Emergenza featured work by 120 emerging artists including: Matthew
Barney, Maurizio Cattelan, Félix González-Torres, Gabriel Orozco, Damien
Hirst, Kiki Smith, Rikrit Tiravanija, Paul McCarthy, Janine Antoni, Rudolf
Stingel, and many more. A roll call of artists, many of whom are now considered
icons of that time, presented at the cusp of an international art explosion in the
early 90s. According to its Wikipedia page, ‘the show became a cult event of the
‘90s, managing to frame what was happening at that time’ and curators often
quote the model as a source of inspiration (2020).
The show was innovative in its engagement of a team of curators with varying
focus, rather than following the usual structure of a single curator’s vision. The
exhibition was therefore extensive and tried to address an early sense of
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globalisation and fragmentation that was then becoming evident in the art world.
The show had no single cohesive curatorial thread other than highlighting the
diversity of emergent art practice and its ever-expanding plurality, which in itself
was another innovative proposition.
My personal experience with this exhibition was fraught with difficulty. Upon
my arrival to the exhibition building, I was told that a space had not been
allocated for the installation of my work. It was like showing up at a formal
dinner to discover that although I was on the guest list, my name had been omitted
from the seating arrangement. In the following days as I waited for a possible
position for my work in the Corederia it became evident that the Director of the
Biennale had included me in this show without clearance or discussion with any
of the ten curators who formed the ‘curatorium’. At one stage, out of frustration, I
tried positioning my work between two alcoves already colonised by other artists,
occupying a kind of thoroughfare. Moments later I was being yelled at in a
booming voice to keep my garbage away from their space. This dilemma
continued for almost a week, I shuffled my work around the exhibition hall
without a place to rest, stateless, and somewhat ‘put out’, to say the least. Finally,
I was randomly squeezed into one of the ten sub-themes of the exhibition, a last minute imposition, and allocated a space near the exit. There, I showed Mr. Big, a
revised version of an installation from the previous year titled The Relativity of
Perfection and first shown at the 9th Biennale of Sydney, The Boundary Rider, in
1992. All of this occurred before I had explored the possibility of casting and
replicating objects and sought to reconfigure specific found objects in gallery
spaces, not as a provocation of what constitutes an artwork, but instead to coax
out a poetic dimension utilising the flimsy, the soiled and the broken.
In its first and initial iteration, the work had comprised a collection of objects
and furniture I had salvaged from my father’s flat. My father lived alone in a
housing commission flat in Redfern and was a terrible hoarder. He lived like an
eccentric in a chaos of mismatched and broken kitsch objects gleaned from the
footpaths of the housing estate, his choices becoming ever more decrepit and
stranger as he aged. The extreme state of his domestic conditions was a source of
embarrassment and repugnance for me, but also fascinating in its sheer anarchic
abandon. This tension reached its threshold when during one of my visits to his
place, my usual disgust and horror began to give way to the aesthetically
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compelling in a collapse and reversal of value. After all, he regarded his
collections of Barbie dolls, which he dressed in packaging tape and the several
heavy velvet armchairs crammed side by side in his lounge room, as grand
adornments to his squalid lodgings. In my father’s total acquiescence to a kind of
gaudy, high baroque entropy, I was finally able to put aside my shame and simply
behold the extraordinary objects that his system had generated. It was an alchemy
of repurposing, from the rubbish pile to his lounge room, in the very particular
way that he laid out and arranged his salvaged items like magical talismans. It
seemed logical that I could then repurpose these objects a second time from the
lounge room to the gallery space. It was here in his lounge, and not in an
encounter with a surrealist artwork in a museum, that I woke up to the potential
and potency of the found object. In my father’s dishevelled dwellings was the
assisted readymade that had undergone some bizarre intervention and modified in
a visually arresting way.
My father was happy for me to take away any object that I liked, and I began
showing them as sculptural components within installations, usually with minimal
intervention or sometimes I would just play around with their display. Mostly I
spent time curating and organising them as worthy of attention. The Relativity of
Perfection was the culmination of this process. As the title suggests, through the
recalibration of taste (value), it was possible to find an alternative place of beauty,
which in the case of the objects retrieved from his flat, were disarming in their
unselfconsciousness and nakedness, but also surprisingly classical and pure. This
was an outsider art that was never intended for display outside of its own context,
and I was the anthropologist who cashed in on its primitive charm.
It is important to note that although this work came out of a familial narrative,
it was not in any way diaristic or positioned within the discourse of what could be
loosely called identity art. This was not a poem about my personal history or the
pain of my people. For me it was an alternative approach to formal artmaking,
pushing content and the political dimension into the background (without
completely denying it) and foregrounding the impersonal and purely visual. This
approach could be seen to parallel a modernist utopian tradition, where form is
function, arriving at a harmonic balance, however, it always runs the risk of
sliding towards what is now called ‘poverty porn’. This tension, between the
sensory experience of the objects’ visual presence and the erasure of their
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previous circulation (even though their previous lives at times threatened to
rudely reassert themselves), situated the work in the realm of a minimalist
idealism, rather than any kind of socially concerned arte povera.
One year later in Aperto, Mr. Big appeared to have contradicted this formal
expression of the readymade with an overt gesture of control and selfconsciousness. This pivot was largely due to the introduction of a figurative
collage element that I used as a structural device for the objects. These were white
cut-out cartoon characters depicting animated credit cards that I copied from the
local ATM machine’s display screen. They were early digital emojis that I would
encounter on a daily basis whilst managing my limited finances on the nearest
ATM. Oversized and dopey, these theatrical and ghostly anthropomorphized
rectangles were attached to the objects as incongruent supports and extraneous
embellishments, hovering around the work, threatening to disappear, or to simply
fall asleep.
The figures were double-faced flat shapes that needed to be viewed in the
round (although there was very little to see, other than their precarious and
rudimentary construction, composed of pencil and felt marker drawn on white
laminated MDF that had been cut to shape then attached to a few impoverished
pieces of furniture). Each element, either a found object or cut-out figure, was in
an active state of emptying out or evacuating, bleached of any possible meaning
other than their own movement toward dissolution.
Where the first version The Relativity of Perfection sought a redemption of the
object, the elaboration, Mr. Big, was an almost violent rejection of the object and
objecthood. Even the title was chosen in an arbitrary way as it just happened to be
the name of the typeface I had chosen for the catalogue, an irony whose full force
was felt only when confronted with the big art world scene. Although this revised
sculptural tableau appeared more measured and knowing than it had previously, it
was nonetheless borne of processes which I did not want to fully control but could
tacitly direct. I can now see that there was no loss of faith in this reworking,
rather, an intensification of an alignment with a hidden order that permeates all
objects, and all artmaking.
Mr. Big was a conscious, if not self-conscious, submission to the haphazard,
the coincidental or fortuitous. Whether my attempt was successful, or even
worthwhile, is secondary to the fact that it is an approach that I consistently return
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to in my art making process, especially now. These early forays in working with
junk that found its way to me rather than me to it, were the formative moments of
my methodology, where my interactions with the material demanded a particular
openness, equanimity and tact. Further, the final effect of the installation in all its
rarefied grubbiness, was a kind of haunted unease; an unseen, vaguely menacing
atmosphere had insinuated itself there. It had a spookiness that I had not intended
but welcomed as an immaterial element. The disconcertion was enhanced by the
piece’s final placement near the exit of the show, literately a non-space that was
easily missed or ignored. Therefore, the drama and degradation of the Aperto
experience was in keeping with the non-rational processes I had engaged, and was
in this sense appropriate, even auspicious.
It is highly unlikely that Baudrillard would have noticed my work—an
anomaly tucked away—in the exhibition. However, if we view Mr. Big through
the lens of his commentary on contemporary art, his critique neatly maps onto the
main characteristics of my work. It is not entirely implausible that he encountered
the piece while it stood in wait, uninstalled and seeking asylum. By offering up
Mr. Big now to Baudrillard’s chopping block, I am interested to see if it can
withstand such scrutiny, and whether this scrutiny could shed light not only on the
work itself, but also on the conditions of its presentation. Do Baudrillard’s
proclamations about the ‘initiation to nullity’ and the conspiracy of art’s ‘insider
trading’ correspond with or contradict Danto’s proposition of an ‘artworld’ as the
sole mechanism capable of art’s creation and the single sanctifying platform by
which one can engage with contemporary art? And how does this ‘initiation to
nullity’ relate to Mr. Big’s gate crashing the inner chambers of the international
‘hot art’ of the day? Additionally, on which side of Baudrillard’s polarities does
Mr. Big sit? On the side of nullity as waste, nothingness and dejecta, or on the
side of form as ‘challenge, seduction and reversibility’? Possibly the work falls in
both camps, necessitating the articulation of a third category.
Ready-made
The Conspiracy of Art is best viewed as a polemic gesture towards culture as a
whole that does not single out any specific artwork or practitioner. However, there
is a sense of shaming and accusation in its moral indignation. Ultimately
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Baudrillard denounces contemporary art as “striving for nullity when already null
and void”, or as Sylvère Lotringer puts it in his entropic introduction to The
Conspiracy of Art:
Going nowhere, art came to nothing—and everything—simply staying
there, grinding its teeth, losing its bite, then losing the point of it all. It is
now floating in some kind of vapid, all-consuming euphoria traversed by
painful spurts of lucidity, sleep-walking in its sleep, not yet dead, hardly
alive, but still thriving (2005, p. 21).
Taking into account the broader context of his writing, Baudrillard believes that
the excessive, fruitless search for total knowledge leads to a kind of delusion. This
pursuit is caught in a web of sign values and relations which are impossible to
untangle, leading to a seduction of the human subject by the object. Baudrillard
names this state ‘hyperreality’, wherein simulation becomes authenticity to the
extent that the world we inhabit becomes a type of museum where many aspects
of our lives are so profoundly aestheticized that we become trapped in a
‘Disneyfied’ reality, or a ‘trans-aestheticisation of banality’. He attributes this
constrictive mode to Duchamp predominantly:
Duchamp set in motion a process in which everyone is now implicated,
including us. What I mean is that in daily life, we have this ‘readymadeness’
or this trans-aestheticization of everything which means that there is no
longer any illusion to speak of…We are all compromised (Baudrillard 2005,
p. 62).
What is this illusion that has been lost? It seems that Baudrillard refers to art’s
‘storming of reality’, be it as mimesis or in Duchamp’s case, the recontextualisation of objects, which Baudrillard sees as having robbed us of a once
grand illusion.
During my stay in Venice in 1993, I visited the Palazzo Grassi where there was
a major exhibition of Marcel Duchamp, entitled simply Duchamp to coincide with
the Biennale. This was an extensive presentation of many of the artist’s famous
and also lesser-known works, and my first encounter with so many iconic pieces
only previously seen in reproduction. The show was carefully curated and
designed, giving each work optimal viewing space amid the opulent surroundings
and diffused light of the Palazzo, making it possible to contemplate the show in an
unhurried and detached manner. The most striking feature of this experience was
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the visual appeal of the works on display, particularly the readymade sculptures.
The famous Bottle Rack (1914) appeared as a formal spatial proposition which
utilised a pattern of concentric rings, spaced and stacked with their rods
protruding, resulting in an entirely totemic structure of sorts. Even more arresting
was the well-known snow shovel titled In Advance of a Broken Arm (1915), with
its narrow arm meeting the elegant, shiny curve of the metal spade, the scale and
proportions of which were so delicate and visually striking that I found myself
beholding something exceptionally beautiful in its exoticism. These objects were
not shocking in their everydayness, because they are not the things that we are
accustomed to seeing every day. At best, they represent an idea of the everyday in
1914. It is difficult for today’s viewer to fully experience the impact of
Duchamp’s original gesture due to the distance we have from the industrial design
of his day. The common store-bought item of 1914 can only be regarded today
with the nostalgia and charm we ascribe to the otherness of old-world relics. The
intended shock of placing these common objects in a gallery is now replaced with
the shock of their unfamiliar beauty. In this sense, the event of Duchamp’s
readymade, which sought to objectify art as idea without the constraints of
aesthetic entanglement or any need for visual acuity, is now undone and returned
to form, leaving us with the difficult task of separating the conceptual gesture
from its retinal registration. This shift can also be seen in an early Jeff Koons
sculpture comprising four vacuum cleaners in a vitrine called New Hoover
Convertibles, New Shelton Wet / Dry 5-Gallon, Double Decker, (1981), which
today suggests a retro 80’s chicness rather than amplifies the banality of an urban
condition.
To complicate matters further, the snow shovel was the first readymade that the
artist produced after his move to the United States in 1915 from France
(toutfait.com) where there was no such object in production. Duchamp had
apparently encountered a snow shovel for the first time in America and presented
this unfamiliar object as an example of the commonplace to his American
audiences. Seemingly, Duchamp selected the snow shovel because of the novelty
and strangeness with which he regarded it, even though an American audience
would not think the same. These inconsistencies allow for the consideration of
whether the inception of the readymade was in fact completely non-retinal or
more likely, games of visual pleasure. Part of Duchamp’s legacy is to alert
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modern audiences to the fact that all things shine and will only do so when
allowed full expression. This might be at odds with how Duchamp is generally
canonised as a tactical player in twentieth-century art, whose reframing of the
objects at hand into objects of art, is most famously exemplified in the urinal
Fountain (1917), which scandalised an entire culture to the point of no return.
Historical distance has delivered Duchamp’s sculpture as something we can only
access now as a mere historical fact, concept, text, public intervention or record of
an idea, yet we still must contend with the material object and the grand old
mystery of its sculptural physicality, now twice removed from its social and
cultural enactment. One can only speculate whether Duchamp could have foreseen
this possible degradation and how he might have imagined the readymade to
function beyond his own time. One clue is in another etymological slip in the
word ‘fashion’, which can mean a dominant aesthetic style, but also to physically
make or shape.
To complicate things further, many of Duchamp’s early readymades, such as
Fountain and Bottle Rack, were either lost or destroyed and needed to be remade
by specialist artisans for consequent exhibitions later in his career. The
readymades attributed to Duchamp that we now see in museums and often in
books are in fact carefully crafted reproductions since the mass-produced
‘originals’ have long been out of circulation. This necessarily replicative process
serves as a yet another stumbling block in how we view these works of ‘the
commonplace’, so far removed from their source that they threaten to undermine
their own logic.
Baudrillard’s claim that Duchamp’s readymade was the catalyst that turned the
entire world into a type of museum could be better understood as a statement
about the forces of industry and market control rather than an indictment of our
disengagement with the real. The ‘trans-aestheticization’, which he laments as
having robbed us of a ‘superior illusion’ (or, the grand traditions of subjectivity)
and replaced it with ‘analytical explorations of the object’, seems to have folded
in on itself, where now it is suddenly possible to find expressive elements or
‘superior illusion’ in these analytical explorations.
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Nowhere
For Baudrillard, Andy Warhol stands out as one of the very few artists who
succeeded in what he called ‘the withdrawal of the creative act’ (Baudrillard 2005,
p. 44) and in so doing, declared him ‘the founder of modernity’. In a 1990
interview titled ‘Starting with Andy Warhol’, Baudrillard argues that Warhol does
not belong to any avant-garde or utopia:
He settles his accounts with utopia because contrary to other artists who
keep deferring the idea, he enters into the heart of utopia, into the heart of
nowhere. He identifies himself with this nowhere, he was this nowhere
place that is the very definition of utopia. He managed to move through the
space of the avant-garde and reach the place it was striving to occupy,
nowhere. But while others still relished the detour through art and
aesthetics, Warhol skipped steps and completed the cycle in a single stroke
(2004, p. 44)
How do Baudrillard’s proclamations of Warhol’s genius manoeuvre of ‘entering
into the heart of nowhere’ compare with his later outbursts that decry art’s
‘nullity’ by “confiscating banality, waste and mediocrity as values and
ideologies”? It is not immediately clear where Baudrillard makes the distinction
between the ‘nullity’ of art that so enrages him and the utopia of the ‘nowhere
man’ he sees in Warhol. Surely this ‘founder of modernity’ had indeed not only
utilised, but claimed mediocrity, waste and excess as the very building blocks of
his artistic enterprise, employing all the strategies that Baudrillard rallied against,
and leaving a rich legacy to so many artists working in the latter part of the 20th
century. From the American photorealist painters of the 1970s to the hyperconsumerist aesthetics of Koons in the 1980s, and on to the massive ‘anything
goes’ moment of the 1990s as seen in Emergency/Emergenza, banality, excess and
perverse aesthetic pleasures were encoded as the key ingredients in the
mainstream cultural soup. In other words, the centrality of the quotidian, the welltraversed tradition of uncovering beauty in unlikely places, to which I am also a
beneficiary, is evident in much twentieth-century art. Yet Baudrillard regarded
many of these projects as ‘mush’ or pretentious repetitions, contrasting Warhol’s
work, which ‘freed us of aesthetics and of art’ through an ultimate cool
indifference, but more importantly, through ‘his gift for dramatization’ (2005, p.
34

43). Baudrillard separates Warhol from his contemporaries by proposing an artist
like Lichtenstein was merely re-aestheticizing social residue in a lyrical manner
whereas in Warhol’s hands, residue becomes “pure substance…giving enigmatic
force back to banality” (Baudrillard 2005, p. 46). This distinction would suggest
that the potency of Warhol’s work is due in large part to his cold, machine-like
system of production, a system that would exhibit high drama as a result of its
profound indifference so severe that it becomes “a poetic operation of tremendous
singularity” (Baudrillard 2005, p. 62):
Nullity, however, is a secret quality that cannot be claimed by just anyone.
Insignificance - real insignificance, the victorious challenge to meaning, the
shedding of sense, the art of the disappearance of meaning - is the rare
quality of a few exceptional works of art that never strive for it (Baudrillard
2005, p. 27).
How is such a manoeuvre possible if it comes about without any directed effort or
‘striving’?
The notion of “the victorious challenge to meaning” is echoed by Agamben’s
thesis on the resistance of ‘doing’ as the crux of artistic flow:
What is poetry if not an in-operation in language on language that
deactivates and renders inoperative the usual communications and
information functions of language in order to open it to new possible use
(2014).
The distinction between effort and intent is important here. Effort implies an
exertion of thought and action whereas intent is activated from within one’s own
being. Intent is, in a sense, the silent witness that connects consciousness with the
phenomenal world. This is not only the site where ontology and the creative strike
a tacit deal, but also where doing philosophy or art can become interchangeable
behaviours. This might help explain Danto’s view of Warhol as a philosopher as
well as Baudrillard’s “exceptional works of art that never strive for it”
(Baudrillard 2005, p. 27).
I operate within this atmosphere in the studio, where trying often leads to
frustration and relinquishing any sense of mastery can result in exciting and fresh
possibilities. While this development is contingent on incidental factors, certain
parameters must be widened to allow for this indeterminacy. My system of
working relies less on interacting with the found and more with recognising the
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given. In not seeking out objects or subjects to work with but rather remaining
alert to what is already there, I reorientate myself around items that are so present
and obvious they are usually ignored. Exemplary and essential components in the
work completed for this studio presentation are blocks of cardboard, some bottle
caps or a piece of packaging foam. In this instance, the parameters have been
widened to include the ever-expanding minutiae but also narrowed to include only
that which is at hand. This demands a certain intent rather than a conscious effort,
which I carry out with a degree of unquestioning and uninformed trust.
The twentieth-century composer, John Cage, is recognised as an important
exponent of artistic indeterminacy and an artist that explicitly challenges meaning,
who also exemplifies Baudrillard’s conceptualisation of nullity (Cage has
claimed, “I don’t have anything to say and I’m saying it” (1961, p. 109). Cage’s
method left all to what he called ‘chance operations’, which allowed for the
incidental to enter the working process, then diligently and precisely be recreated,
often as sound performance. Amongst Cage’s prolific output one work of
particular significance, 4’33” (1952), is an entire composition based on chance
operations in which the performer sits at the piano in readiness. This was an
example of Cage’s method of letting sounds be themselves: a musical composition
in three movements, where the pianist does not generate any sound except for the
occasional opening and closing of the keyboard cover, and the ‘music’ is the
ambient sound in the room for the duration of four minutes and thirty-three
seconds. 4’33” is also an example of an engagement with what is at hand. Cage
actually wrote the piece note-by-note and in doing this carried out a mimetic
action that allowed his audience to participate in the piece’s creation. The piece
encourages the listener to become aware of the actual experience of listening,
widening the aural field where even the sound of a cough becomes interesting.
Cage claims the basic material of music as pure sound, which allows for the equal
impact of both sonic presence and absence.
Cage supports Gosetti-Ferencei’s discussion of trompe l’oeil which, in her
view, reflects the constitution of the everyday, raising questions about our
fallibilities of perception. Her thesis makes the case for the persistence of trompe
l’oeil as a mimetic strategy which,
…renders the quotidian ecstatic, for the viewer becomes gradually aware of
the way the appearance of the most everyday things are indebted to the
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structure of perceptual expectation and its build-up of habits (2007, p.217).
Cage confirms the view that contained within the quotidian, more than anywhere
else, is the possibility of ecstatic experience where the mimetic is activated as a
state of heightened attention. This possibility is linked to Cage’s regard for eastern
philosophies that call for the dissolution of ego as a means to awakening. Setting
aside an assumed knowledge about the ‘self’ clears a perceptual obstacle and
allows life to be seen in its fullness.
Is this the ‘storming of reality’ that Baudrillard decries? Or is it an entry point
into what he calls ‘the heart of utopia’ or ‘the heart of nowhere’? In Cage’s 4’33”
there is an emphasis on the background and a refocusing on the peripheral that
requires one to attend to the spaces around sound with a new awareness. For
Duchamp, this was the awareness of that which is hidden in plain view, requiring
the same quality of receptivity alluded to by Agamben, where volition and
submission operate in tandem.
When thinking about this approach in the making of my other recent work (not
included as part of this thesis), which takes as its content the paint spills and
splatters that occur outside of the picture frame, the question arises as to where the
limits of this periphery might be. These works are photographs of the accidental
smudges and drips left on a painter’s studio wall which are then printed directly
onto the gallery wall utilising a vertical inkjet printer. If the central focus of the
finished work is now that which lies at the edges, what then are the peripheral
elements that sit outside of these observations? Where is the periphery of the
periphery? If we continue to zoom out towards an infinitely receding horizon of
all that hides in the margins, is that where we sense, in this perpetual non-arrival,
the ‘special insignificance’ to which Baudrillard alludes?
Heidegger points to a primal entanglement of philosophy’s pursuit of ‘genuine
truth’ with art’s trust in ‘pure perception’—or philosophy’s effort and art’s intent:
Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to
beholding, and only by such seeing does being get discovered. Primordial
and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the
foundation of Western philosophy (1927, p.215).
This age-old tussle continues to play out on the compacted ground of mimesis.
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Chapter 4
Minemata
Included as the first entry in the comprehensive volume A Companion to Art
Theory, published in 2002, is Göran Sörbom’s chapter titled ‘The Classical
Concept of Mimesis’. That the subject of mimesis is chosen to open this
exhaustive collection of “specially commissioned articles which provide a
convenient overview of the latest trends and critical directions [in art theory]” is
significant. Being the lead essay in the vast compendium speaks not only of the
primacy of what is termed ‘mimesis’, but also of the instability of its meaning
over time. Sörbom introduces the term as what the Greeks of antiquity
characterised as:
the basic nature of painting and sculpture, poetry and music, dance and
theatre, i.e. things we today call works of art, most of them agreed that such
things were mimemata (in singular form mimema), the result of an activity
they named mimesis (2002, p. 19).
Central to Sörbom’s thesis is the idea of an ancient conceptual separation between
what one knows intellectually and what one knows sensually. The mimetic faculty
was considered to be within the field of the senses and was the common ability to
“see and hear individual things where no such things are at hand” (Sörbom 2002,
p. 26). Sörbom expands:
The mimetic faculty is twofold in nature; every human being has the ability
to see or hear mimemata, for instance in shadows and reflections in water,
but only some persons have learnt the skill and practise (the techne) of
producing mimemata, i.e. “manmade dreams for those who are awake” in
Plato’s formulation (2002, p. 27).
Such human dreams existed as pictures or objects designed to trigger the mimetic
faculty in the viewer, producing a mental image of the external object represented.
The metaphor used by the ancients for this process is a kind of pressure that
pushes its shape upon the senses leaving a negative imprint of its image minus its
matter. This same process of an impression stamped onto the mind is how Sörbom
interprets the ancients’ understanding of the initial perceptive or apprehensive act
of creating a mental image. This analogy closely corresponds to the process of
mould making, where an object is defined by the negative space it leaves in a soft
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material. The difference between the two functions of perception and
representation is that with perception, the mental image resembles the external
object encountered, whereas the mimema can and does not share all of the
properties with the representation: “If it did, it would not be a mimema of that
thing but a second example of it” (Sörbom 2002, p. 22). While seemingly
straightforward, this is not simple, as this process requires the mimema to only
partially resemble its referent, which should result in “a mental image
representing something particular and contingent which it in itself it is not”
(Sörbom 2002, p. 22). Therefore, the mimema must, by its own definition, be a
generalisation that only approaches the external object as a type of description that
cannot be confused with the thing itself.
The external model for the mimema can also be a composite of qualities of
tangible objects configured into a single idealisation. These ideals were most
valued when realised as lifelike mimemata, quite different from the modern sense
of naturalism or realism. The quality of a composite lifelikeness was a
representation of “life in its most obvious potential—Life was defined as the
interplay between body and soul”.
So, the claim for lifelikeness was far from a wish for realistic copying of
individual things, but a wish to represent man’s most valuable property,
namely that of being a living body-soul unit…The ability to represent the
body-soul unit is the remarkable innovation of the classical period which
changed the whole history of picture making and picture understanding
(Sörbom 2002, p. 26).
To summarise, the classical notion of mimesis was a human faculty common to all
as an act of perception or apprehension of the world. But the creation of
mimemata was possible only to those with the acquired skill (techne) to produce a
mimema, such as a painting, a play or a poem. These results were regarded as
intangible impressions pressed onto the mind as approximations of the given
subject or object, predating the notion of Fine Art. The source material for these
depictions could be a combination of several forms to create a hybridised ideal or
even just a product of imagination. The mimema was highly regarded when it
testified to the interplay of internal and external life forces present in the subject
and therefore presenting as if animate.
Can the theory of mimesis, in the classical sense, be useful in understanding
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later representational art practises, particularly contemporary practises that utilise
lifelike depictions and facsimiles? And are these later practises concerned with
revealing something of the hidden nature of visible world, or do they function in
some other way?
Moths
Having retrieved the incomplete sculptural exercises from the art school yard and
deciding that they could be utilised as components in my own work, I then set
about arranging and organising them in different ways to try and see what they
could do. One piece was a fragment of hard wood, rectangular in shape that had
been sawn roughly along its plane in an attempt to make it thinner. The cuts did
not go all the way through, leaving a wafer-thin flap along its surface. This was a
particularly obnoxious piece of wood bearing the marks of a struggling circular
saw, making it look like a botched attempt at slicing dense bread. I moved it
around my bench for months, confounded by its uselessness, until I stood it on its
end. For a moment it resembled some sort of insect, then it was just a piece of
wood again. I then propped it atop a block of thick corrugated cardboard, and it
instantly appeared to be a moth. There was no doubting its ‘mothness’ in the
colour and texture of the wood’s rough surface and the slight opening of its wing
formed by the flap of the incomplete cut. Its ‘realism’ was finally confirmed by
perching it onto the edge of the cardboard block, making it seem weightless and
poised. I then decided to add antennae made of wire as a final animating gesture.
This was what can only be described as a joyous moment. So special that, I
thought, it could not be repeated. Some days later I turned my attention to a piece
of fired terracotta that had been haphazardly fashioned into a kind of hollow
cylinder. The clay had been reinforced with chicken wire which was now partially
exposed during firing. At first, I resisted the urge to try and make it into another
moth, then decided that it only needed something to fill the hollow for it to have
an internal body and so that the terracotta shell could resemble wings. It was at
this point that I sensed the tension between the assertion of control in order to
affect a desired result and the more passive approach of letting the material lead.
However, the prescription of a moth was in many ways as intangible as my
primitive way of trying to describe it. I pressed on, realising that the internal body
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also needed to culminate in some sort of pointy head for it to have a front and a
behind. I looked over at my kitchen bench and saw a baguette that could fit this
purpose. The baguette was too thin for the hollow of the cylinder, but its crusty
end sticking out of the front of the ceramic sleeve certainly resembled an insect
head. I now only needed something to fill the gap between the bread and the
ceramic shell. I then sprayed the cavity with expanding foam which held the bread
in place and caulked the gap, making it look like a cannoli. Unfortunately, at this
point, the nozzle of the expanding foam canister failed and blasted out foam onto
the wall and bench, leaving piles of slowly growing epoxy clouds all over my
apartment. I managed to rescue the sculpture and contain the mess using big
pieces of cardboard.
The foam that was applied to the sculpture eventually settled around the tip of
the baguette, which was now embedded in the terracotta cylinder to look like the
furry collar of a moth surrounding its dark little head. I set this object on a fourlegged plastic stand that had been used as a prop for another sculpture and
suddenly another moth came to life. This iteration was very different from the first
but undoubtedly a moth with its wings tightly drawn in and its fluffy head poking
out. I continued creating other moths over the next months, using bits and pieces
found at the art school and elsewhere. The shape and weave of a flattened old
basket became the extraordinary silky pattern on moth wings and thus easily
transformed by simply attaching it to the wall at a slight angle. I even recognised a
moth in a discarded cello body that had no neck.
These actions would all classify as classically mimetic by recognising
something where that thing does not actually exist. This is the mimetic in an act of
new awareness, an act of seeing likeness and similitude. To be more exact, these
activities were more like adventures than simple imaginings. Such exploits were
always unpredictable and would come about from a series of small clues that I
would watch and follow, as if on a safari, over a period of minutes or sometimes
weeks, to arrive at a thing—often a moth—that I had not anticipated.
The moth sculptures also adhere to Sörbom’s additional analysis of mimesis
through their composite nature, where the creatures only announce their arrival
when there is a sense of sentient reality discerned beyond their component parts.
These were hybrid forms, made of disparate found elements that eventually came
together to convey a coherent living form, a description less concerned with an
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accurate rendering than with a convincing impression of vital life.
Simulated Readymades
‘Representation’ implies an interpretation of the thing presented and takes
liberties with its subject in order to convey certain qualities—as in my initial
assemblages of moths. ‘Replication’, however, strives for a fidelity and realism
that mirrors its subject without need for poetic devices or idealisation—this is the
territory of trompe l’oeil. Replication is necessarily methodical, requiring
particular technologies, leaving little to chance and adhering to a prescribed
sequence of steps and procedures. Yet both representation and replication are
grounded in mimesis in that they both rely on the external referent as their source.
I complete my moth assemblages through an act of replication—mimesis now
as techne. They are cast to look as close to the original conglomeration of found
objects as possible. Although this serves a unifying function of its constituent
parts, by simply remaking the whole thing out of a single substance, the final
result looks very much like the original aggregation of found elements.
This is quite different from say, Picasso’s famous sculpture, Bull’s Head, 1942
comprising a bicycle seat attached to handlebars, cast entirely in bronze and which
resembles the horned head of a bull. Picasso’s bronze cast is a single dark colour
that is closer to the shadow of the original than the actual object, acting more as a
representation of the assemblage (the representation of a representation) instead of
its simulation. The re-renderings that my moth depictions undergo allow the work
to function as both representation and replication, portrayal and clone, in a double
layer of mimetic operation whilst not exclusively one or the other. It could be
here, in the push and pull of trying and not trying, of control and compliance, that
the fabricated and the given are merged, perhaps providing an example of creative
labour as both quantification and qualia.
Sörbom’s description of mimesis as an apprehension of reality instead of a
slavish copying offers a pathway through the phenomenal world to better inhabit
it. But what does “apprehending reality” actually mean? Why not just say ‘seeing
reality’ or ‘witnessing reality’? ‘Apprehension’ has three separate meanings:
firstly, it can mean comprehension or recognition, secondly, a sense of trepidation
or doubt, and thirdly, an act of seizure or grasping. The combination of all three
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meanings gives the full sense of ‘mimetic apprehension’ as a type of cognisance
that must include some uncertainty in order to take a hold on something. And so,
with my convincing replications of a sculptural assemblage, there exists a
perpetual sliding between recognition, doubt and capture, cognisance, uncertainty
and holding.
In a 1994 essay titled ‘Simulated Readymades’, Boris Groys discusses the
work of Swiss artists Peter Fischli and David Weiss, arguing that nature produces
and “he who lives in and with nature also produces—but it is the wise who
reproduce” (1994, p. 33). Groys explains the two approaches to decommissioning
objects from their use value and subsequent refiguring as artworks. The first is the
long-established practice of the readymade in which the reframing of everyday
items into art objects demands a perceptual leap on the part of the artist and the
viewer. Groys describes this leap as a crossing of the invisible threshold that
separates art and reality:
It is defined by the individual’s inner, purely mental decision to see things
differently; it acquires mythical dimensions. Crossing it begins to resemble
a religious conversion, an inner enlightenment that allows us to see the
familiar from a new angle and to contemplate what is hidden below surfaces
(1994, p. 34).
Groys provides a spiritual interpretation that encourages a refocus on the object’s
pure appearance, stripping it of its sign value and disabling its normal circulation
(1994, p. 34). But the readymade can always be returned to the kitchen or the
hallway from whence it came, and none would be the wiser. The threat of the
readymade or found object’s potential reversibility problematises the perceptual
shifts required for its existence as an object of art and therefore casts doubt on this
“spiritual interpretation”. A peculiarly discombobulating quality of the readymade
and the found object that is built into their realisations is the constant oscillation
between art and reality. The “inner enlightenment”, as Groys puts it, is
unsustainable, usually momentary and sporadic. Yet Groys places the casting of
spiritual doubt in the second category of objects; the fabricated copy such as the
carved, lifelike sculptures of ordinary objects by Fischli and Weiss.
In the early 1990s Fischli and Weiss produced numerous sculptural
installations comprised of facsimiles of utilitarian objects carved in polyurethane.
These were installed in galleries, with some appearing as if workers had suddenly
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abandoned their stations. The piece, titled TABLE (1993), depicts a worktable
strewn with tools, paint cans, buckets, dried up paint rollers and brushes, sticks
and rags, all carved in polyurethane and carefully painted to an exacting realism.
The overall effect is that of an urgent repair or chaotic renovation that was carried
out in a frenzy of spilt paint and excessive haste, where the artisans had suddenly
departed, leaving behind a grand tableau of disarray. Another work from 1993,
VASE, in contrast to TABLE, depicts a single, unadorned ceramic vase placed on a
plinth. VASE is also a carved and painted replication, but without the theatricality
of TABLE, sitting so inconspicuously and unassuming to the point of sheer
immodesty. Although the two works differ dramatically in their subject—one
alluding to a specific activity or narrative while the other is a statement of utmost
singularity—they both share a tacit celebration of the excavation and visualisation
of their visages. There is a sense of revelation in the material articulation of their
detail: the more banal the feature, the more revelatory. For example, in my
representation of a moth, the unlikely collision of a baguette and expanding foam
may at first seem jarring and rather drastic. Yet when these two elements are
reconstituted as a lifelike, coloured cast, their relationship becomes a source of
fascination, offering an alternative mode of visual engagement. The subtlety of
their shape, colour and surface comes to the fore precisely because they have been
carefully crafted, forcing a heightened scrutiny of and delight in these features.
This takes precedence over any initial displeasure at ruining a good piece of bread
with epoxy foam.
Groys proposes that Fischli and Weiss attempt “desecrate modern art’s
mystical pretentions underlying the practice of the readymade” (1994, p. 37). His
essay concludes with the assertion that the individual’s necessary inner
transformation in the face of readymade object is, in a sense, a type of technology
which twentieth-century art deploys to compete with broader technological market
forces:
Peter Fischli/Davis Weiss do not like modern technology…above all they
reject the technological improvements—namely the practice of the
readymade—that has been so successfully employed in the enactment of
artistic efficacy that the speed of the fine arts today easily rivals the speed of
modern technology. And indeed, is there anything faster than changing
one’s inner gaze? It is only because such change has become the essential
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technology of art in our century that modern art learnt to compete in the
economic arenas of our society (Groys 1994, p. 37).
If Groys insists that the basic practise of the readymade is fraught with the
mystical overtones of the viewer’s internal transformation, and that these
internalised responses in the viewer can be seen as a type of technological
development (which Fischli and Wiess oppose), then what do we make of the
mysterious transformations, both on the part of the viewer and the object, inherent
to the technologies of the sculptural facsimile and minemata? The reproduction of
reality as graven image or idol does not necessarily desecrate what it describes,
instead it increases the possibility of deeper contemplation and wonderment.
Groys alludes to this early in the essay about the Fischli and Weiss facsimiles:
We are radically confronted by a surface which cannot be penetrated
because it conceals nothing but void. The polyurethane used by the artists is
merely a physical metaphor for this void…They produce a pre-scientific,
pre-philosophical world that deals with only two things: what we see with
our eyes and, as additional information, how what we see with our eyes has
been created out of nothingness. It was once possible to find this
information in the Bible—nowadays people look for it in exhibition
catalogues (1994, p.33).
Groys here acknowledges the “pre-scientific and pre-philosophical world” that
such practises invoke and unambiguously declares them miraculous but contends
that the lifelike sculptures by Fischli and Weiss are somehow ironic and therefore
stand against spiritual interpretation. This, he says, is a result of replacing the
classical model of the readymade, which requires “the light of inner
enlightenment”, with a (somewhat cynical) revival of hand crafted replicants. For
Groys, the simulation of the readymade is an undermining of modern art’s pursuit
of the sublime, pointing to a pragmatism of irony and distrust by engaging
antiquated methods of representation, such as carving. For me, there is little trace
of cynicism or distrust in these artists’ simulation works; on the contrary, they
highlight a primal drive to copy and mime, as exemplified in its revival of arcane
and ancient practises. There is even a sense reverence or worship in the attention
to the minute detail of these counterfeit scenes of workshop mayhem.
During the casting processes in my own work, there is always a great
excitement and thrill in the removal of a cast from its mould. Even though I’m
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well aware of the technology involved in the process, I never cease to marvel at
the sheer magic of the arrival of an object out of nothing. With every cast, I am
astounded by the simple and profound manifestation of articulated reality from
void. This sensation is more exaggerated in my particular casting process where
the colour is mixed into a clear resin before each coloured resin mixture is
carefully poured into its corresponding recess in the mould. When set and
demoulded, the piece emerges whole and complete with little need for any kind of
painting or finishing. This moment of revelation, which Groys describes as a thing
created out of nothingness (Groys 1994), often feels more like a supernatural
event than a technical process. This was the case when removing the cast of a
moth assemblage from its mould. The sculpture slowly appeared as I tore back the
silicone where, for a moment, I was profoundly uncertain whether I was exposing
the coloured resin cast or the blackened sheets of plywood the assemblage was
originally made of.
In her discussion of trompe l’oeil, Gosetti-Ferecei quotes Baudrillard:
As a genre, trompe l’oeil is an extremely conventional and metaphysical
exercise—is such a highly ritualised form precisely because it is not derived
from painting but from metaphysics (Baudrillard in Gosetti-Ferecei 1988, p.
231).
I recognise the important distinction between painting and trompe l’oeil, though I
have sometimes regarded my casting to be akin to painting in its reliance on
working with layers of liquified colour that harden into a kind of threedimensional picture. But there is something more vital in the trompe l’oeil, which
is better articulated by the dictionary definition of metaphysics as “phenomena
beyond the scope of scientific inquiry” that transcends the laws of nature (Oxford
English Dictionary 2021). Baudrillard is correct in seeing trompe l’oeil as a
highly ritualised form because of its direct address to the laws of nature, to the
point of hubris.
Gosetti- Ferencei later extends her discussion on trompe l’oeil, noting that it,
…exposes the everyday experience in its perceptual contingency, its
dependence upon fallible perception, and its vulnerability to ecstatic
reflection—the ordinary givenness of everyday reality is disturbed—in the
viewer affected by trompe l’oeil, doubt has been implanted (GosettiFerencei 2007, p. 219).
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The implanted doubt is caused not just by illusion, but by the fact that we are
susceptible to visual manipulations. The deception or ‘trick of the eye’, must
announce its fraudulence in order to complete the feat; it must tell us what it is not
for it to truly enchant. These metaphysical practises do not preclude the presence
of humour and play, of which there is ample evidence in Fischli and Weiss as well
as my own work, but this should not be confused with what Groys misconstrues as
the artists’ ironic use of antiquated techniques.
Things
When Fischli and Weiss simulate quotidian objects, they are not, as one might
think, engaging in some elaborate ruse to hoodwink their audience. What they are
doing is a kind of ‘de-naming’ or ‘un-identifying’ in order to gain a new
understanding of their subject. That is, the process of recreating any given object
results in the object’s permanent loss of previous identity. The process of
imitation does not seek to define in the conventional sense, but to clear a semantic
breathing space around the object. It ceases to be the some-thing of its intended
purpose and becomes the thing. A ‘thing’ is special because it contains both the
indefinite and the specific. It signifies that which cannot be named, the
audaciously ambiguous and at the same time, the hidden character or essence of
the matter. This is the readymade that is rendered irreversible by its copy and
finally seen in all its strangeness and particularity. It is a play between the
congruous and incongruous, which can certainly provide a space for “spiritual
interpretation” (Groys 1994, p.37).
In his essay titled ‘Thing Theory’, Bill Brown explores the “specific
unspecificity that things denote” (2001, p. 3):
You could imagine things as what is excessive in objects, as what exceeds
their mere materialisation as objects or their mere utilisation as objects—
their force as a sensuous presence or as a metaphysical presence, the magic
by which objects become values, fetishes, idols, and totems (2001, p. 5).
These excesses of the object, which are typically hidden in normal function, pour
forth when reflected in their re-presentation and re-creation, particularly in
sculptural practice where the object occupies real space. Although both the
readymade object and its simulation may appear identical, the very contrivance of
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the reproduction enshrouds the object with a particular sanctity and beauty—an
aura of absolute uniqueness. This might also help explain the aesthetic appeal of
the reproductions of Duchamp’s lost or destroyed readymades.
Before Brown ironically turns to a passage from A. S. Byatt’s novel The
Biographer’s Tale (2000) where the protagonist, a doctoral student fed up with
ideas and theories, longs for the real world and tells himself that he ‘must have
things’, Brown begins his discussion of thing theory with a series of questions
about the necessity of theory and the desire for the existence of immutable,
uncomplicated ‘things’:
Is there something perverse, if not archly insistent, about complicating
things with theory? Do we really need anything like thing theory the way we
need narrative theory or cultural theory or queer theory or discourse theory?
Why not let things alone? Let them rest somewhere else—in the balmy
elsewhere beyond theory. From there, they might offer us dry ground above
those swirling accounts of the subject, some place of origin unmediated by
the sign, some stable alternative to the instabilities and uncertainties, the
ambiguities and anxieties, forever fetishized by theory. Something warm,
then, that relieves us from unnecessary abstraction (2001, p. 1).
Can mimetic apprehension relieve us of unnecessary abstraction and theoretical
thought? Wherever that “balmy somewhere else beyond theory” might be, it is
something I instinctively pursue as a perceptual experience. Such perceptions are
in the functioning of the sense organs, the strange chemical and electrical string of
events within the physical body that activate the imagination before the intellect.
Image
Usually, the likeness of an object tells us more about the object than what we
thought we knew of that object. What we perceive now becomes only image, an
incredible image untethered from its previous questionable identity. By
relinquishing conceptual assumptions and concentrating on surface appearance,
the mimema is set in the illusory realm of image making, or possibly, mirage
making.
In ‘The Space of Literature’, Maurice Blanchot discusses the object’s
relationship to its image, which in turn highlights the image’s alliance to the
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imaginary (1955). Blanchot’s meditations on the image offer a succinct account,
albeit in poetic form, of the remoteness of reflection, which “appear more refined
than the object reflected” (Blanchot 1955, p. 256). Blanchot calls this the object’s
double when he asserts that,
…it is linked to the possibility for objects to ‘appear’, to surrender, that is to
the pure and simple resemblance behind which there is nothing—but being.
Only that which is abandoned to the image appears, and everything that
appears is, in this sense, imaginary (Blanchot 1955, p. 259).
The connection between the imagined and the image is echoed in Sörbom’s
chapter as “man-made dreams produced for those who are awake”. Mimesis, in
this classical sense, is a type of conjuring where a detailed landscape can be seen
on the surface of a rock, or in the case of mimemata, a human-made rendering
which evokes a reality that is not actually there. In both cases, the imaginary
works at the forefront of such transfigurations.
The relationship between the image and the imagined resonates with Bill
Brown’s indefinite yet definite ‘thingness’. Regarding metaphysics, both Brown
and Blanchot declare insight beyond the initial sign value of the article. Both
similarly describe the suddenness of objects becoming things or images,
particularly when damaged or deactivated, which also recalls Agamben’s ‘inoperativity’:
We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for
us; the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, when
their flow within the circuits of production, and distribution, consumption
and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily (Brown 2001, p. 4).
By analogy, we might also recall that a tool, when damaged, becomes its image
(and sometimes an aesthetic object like those Andre Breton loved). In this case the
tool, no longer disappearing into its use, appears. This appearance of the object is
that of resemblance and reflection; the object’s double, if you will (Blanchot
1955, p. 257).
In each case there is ‘the appearance’ of things or images emerging from a
pause in normal function, when an object withdraws from normal utility and
reveals the genuine version of itself. Blanchot extends this concept, likening it to a
cadaver, which he calls the ‘The Cadaverous Resemblance’. When the dead are
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removed from us and we look on a lifeless body, “the mourned deceased begins to
resemble himself”:
Himself: is this not an ill-chosen expression? Shouldn’t we say: the
deceased resembles the person he was when he was alive? ‘Resembles
himself’ is, however, correct. ‘Himself’ designates the impersonal being,
distant and inaccessible, which resemblance, that it might be someone’s,
draws toward day. Yes, it is he, the dear living person, but all the same it is
more than he. He is more beautiful, more imposing; he is already
monumental and so absolutely himself that it is as if he were doubled by
himself, joined to his solemn impersonality by resemblance and by the
image (Blanchot 1955, p. 256-257).
Blanchot’s meditation on the power of resemblance through the absence of life
force at first seems opposed to Sörbom’s analysis of the mimetic in classical art,
where the body/soul interplay is prized. Blanchot continues:
This magnified being, imposing and proud, which impresses the living as
the appearance of the original never perceived until now…this grandeur,
through its appearance of supreme authority, may well bring to mind the
great images of classical art. If this connection is justified, the question of
classical art’s idealism will seem rather vain. And we might bear in mind the
thought that idealism has, finally, no guarantee other than a corpse. For this
indicates to what extent the apparent intellectual refinement, the pure
virginity of the image is originally linked to the elemental strangeness and to
the formless weight of being, present in absence (Blanchot 1955, p. 258).
At first, this passage contradicts the classical view that mimesis seeks to describe
soul in flesh, where Blanchot maintains that the absence of life from flesh reveals
a truer image of a being. Yet both views would support the ancient idea of an
impression that describes that which is no longer there. From a footprint in wet
sand one can see the trace details of the person’s tread, their gait and the
particularities of their toes possibly better than one could when overwhelmed by a
real-life encounter with the foot. Even more significantly, the imprint suggests
how outlandish and marvellous this thing we call foot is.
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Voiding
Not all of my interactions with the material I gleaned from the art school resulted
in an interpretation of a moth. The image of the moth was something that I was
open to but could only bring about with the right combination of elements. During
this time, I came across a block of limestone in the sculpture yard, approximately
thirty centimetres cubed, the top of which had been partially and crudely carved,
leaving two rough cavities in its upper surface. This block had been left outside in
the soil under a tree, where it became stained and blotchy around its base. It was
an intriguing object that had an undeniable presence, especially when I took it
inside and set it on the floor of my apartment. For months I could not figure out
what to do with this thing. As much as I liked it, there was no entry point for a
possible interaction with it because it was so self-contained and perfectly
proportioned. Then, one night after taking out the recycling, I noticed that I had
left a glass jar behind, sitting on the floor next to the block. Suddenly, there was a
dialogue between the two objects; the block now looked monumental and solemn
next to the empty clear vessel that now appeared to have some odd ceremonial
function. The more I contemplated this pair of objects, the more they suggested a
vanishing or dramatic departure of some kind. These were the remains of an
evaporation of sorts, whose traces could be seen in the two cavities on top of the
block and insinuated in the stark emptiness of the jar. This enigmatic relationship
was a sufficient signal for me to proceed with their casting.
Making a mould of an open jar with a solid bottom is a very difficult task. The
vessel needs to be filled with liquified silicone that then overflows and covers the
external surface of the jar. Once the silicone sets, it forms a solid block of rubber
that becomes locked inside the jar whilst also enveloping the jar’s outer walls. The
only way to remove the jar from its mould is to smash the glass and carefully pull
out individual shards through the millimetres wide channel of its cylindrical wall.
As unpleasant as this was, it was critical that the jar be cast as a single hollow
vessel, not in two halves. This painstaking process was the most direct way of
creating the cast without visible seams. Next came the casting of the jar, which
involved pouring clear resin into the narrow channels of the mould to replicate the
glass. This process was also problematic because the viscosity of the resin did not
allow for its free flow into the fine recesses of the mould and threatened potential
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air locks, which would cause gaping holes in the final cast. If anything went
wrong during these perilous steps, I would need to start the whole process. I
eventually circumvented the pouring issue by using a very slow setting resin that
would take a full day to settle into the mould and let the bubbles slowly rise
before hardening. After a week of curing, the piece had become sufficiently brittle
to de-mould, however, I faced the same problem in removing the resin jar from
the block of silicone rubber. Rather than breaking the jar, as I had to make the
mould, the silicone had to be cut away piece by piece from the inside of the jar.
After hours of pushing sharp blades into the silicone mass and slowly removing
small fragments of the rubber, the empty jar was finally birthed whole.
The casting of the limestone block was much easier, requiring a simple fivesided silicone jacket. The staining and discolouration around the base of the block
had impregnated the porous stone which in turn had transferred onto the surface of
the silicone mould. When the piece was cast in a resin pigmented to match the
overall colour of the stone, the stains and blotches transferred once again onto the
resin cast, blemishing the base with the actual dirt and mildew of the original. The
high fidelity of the cast stone surface, with its every splodge of muck and carved
gouge, made it almost indistinguishable from the original.
The reason I have outlined the fabrication process of this particular work is to
foreground the conceptual connection that sometimes exists between the casting
process and the sculpture itself, when method and subject meet. The jar in
particular speaks to the filling and emptying necessary in the moulding and
casting process. It is both a container and an object that needs to be contained,
transforming from liquid to solid. These fundamental processes of flooding and
evacuation, holding and being held, forming cells for empty space, all correlate
with the tenor and essence of the glass jar itself. Similarly, the block of limestone,
which shows the concerted removal of material to create hollows and voids,
demonstratively recounts the microcavities that interface with the absorbent
surfaces in its remaking. This is where the sheer physicality of the making can
overlap with the riddle of creative labour—where the manual toil becomes
analogous to and symbolic of the object’s underlying intimations. Here again we
find a way to unlock meaning in the very words assigned to these activities. The
word ‘cast’ is used to describe a projection or throwing into remote spaces. There
is a sense of unknowability in casting something out into the expanse. When we
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cast a fishing net or light, we go forth into emptiness but with the hope of
retrieving fish or seeing more clearly, neither expectation guaranteed. ‘To cast’
can also be to define or claim, as in casting a vote, casting a shadow, or casting a
spell. Common to each application of the word is the sense of directed energy
pushed outwards, which is necessarily subjected to a passage through the
undetermined as the very means of its realisation.
Having completed the casting process, I placed the jar and the block side-byside on the floor as I had first seen them. There was now an even stronger sense of
something funerary and departed, recalling the profound emptying that Blanchot
sees as an idealism “that has no guarantee other than a corpse…the formless
weight of being presence in absence” (Blanchot 1955, p. 258). I eventually
realised that the jar I had cast was the very same jar that I had to urinate into
whilst recuperating from bladder cancer surgery weeks before. This was the result
of the sudden discovery of a tumour that needed urgent removal from my bladder,
and I remembered the doctor’s term for emptying the bladder was ‘voiding’.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This practice-based doctoral research project has elucidated the impetus behind
my studio methodology. Through a combination of philosophical investigation
and reflection, I have appraised my work’s connection to its historical artistic
precedents as well as identified divergences. In doing so I have focused on two
key antecedents for the studio work conducted as part of this research. These are
possibly two of the most discussed works of the twentieth century: Brillo Box and
Bottle Rack, which have presented a set of problems concerned with the transition
of everyday artefacts into artworks. In many ways, these works act as stand ins for
my own practise, allowing me to objectify my studio activity, which is often
carried out intuitively and wordlessly. The transition of the everyday object into
an artwork has been beholden to institutional validation and aesthetic legitimacy
as determined by various philosophical measures and certain members of the
artworld. While these institutional mechanisms have played a role in sanctioning
the transformations, they do so predominately by providing a setting, both
temporal and physical, where these procedures can be carried out. This raises the
question of whether the artistic transformation of objects is dependent on
institutional framing or not.
Both Brillo Box and Bottle Rack are alike in that they engage with quotidian
objects as their primary mode of operation, but they differ radically in their
secondary mode of production. Each serves a mimetic function in that they both
represent something which they are not. Even as an unaltered object, Bottle Rack
has been separated from its normal utility and allowed to exist in its primary
condition as pure image, no longer an object in a cellar but instead, a more
authentic version of itself.
The two works differ in the additional act of simulation that Brillo Box
employs or trompe l‘oeil as the second mode of operation. Trompe l’oeil, which
can be thought of as an amplification of mimesis, has been historically deemed a
lesser art form that merely deceives the eye and impresses with technical
virtuosity. But behind the retinal trickery is an agitation that challenges our
habitual processing of sense data. Of particular significance is trompe l’oeil’s
dependence on the depiction of the inconsequential or quotidian, rhyparography’s
54

reminder of a pre-philosophical moment. What then, does the quotidian quality
that both works share, actually refer to? If it is the mundane, the commonplace,
the unremarkable, then the implication is that we live as if only partially conscious
and everything within our range of vision is always remarkable and exciting to
behold. What warrants being labelled average, mundane or ordinary? Nothing,
really. Not even a carton of soap pads or a drying rack could be truly called
‘uninteresting’. The idea that a representation of a boring object plucked from our
generic reality can be transformed into a new sensation simply through its
simulation is only partially true and appeals to those who refuse to look or are
already bored. Granted, to actively surrender one’s full attention, as a maker or a
spectator, does help us to awaken slightly to the vastness around us. But to
categorise this perceptual realm as existing within measurably ‘common’ or
‘extraordinary’ spaces, only perpetuates the sluggish visualisation of “political
ordering of representation” (Gosetti-Ferencei 2007, p. 224).
The underlying function of artworks like Brillo Box, and in many ways Bottle
Rack, is to dispel any notion of the pedestrian, the banal or the routine. It may then
follow that their institutional framing does not necessarily help enact these
intentions but instead, hinders them by virtue of the indexical nature of
museological structures and the high/low categories that ensue, which ultimately
result in a diminished experience of the work. This is clearly a generalisation, but
one necessary to reclaim a forgotten sense of childlike awe that has been adrift in
an ocean of isms and theoretical speculation. This is the effort in turning away
from the shadows on the cave wall to find not only the forms that create them but
the light source beyond. With this in mind, perhaps all art is in some way mimetic
and the quotidian does not exist.
The moth sculptures which form a large part of my studio presentation are
pertinent to this discussion in that they represent lifeforms that are mostly static
when we encounter them. One usually only sees a moth in flight when it’s trying
to get away or speeding towards a light. More often, we see household moths in
complete stillness, clinging to a surface like a delicate wood shaving. Their
presence is striking because it seems they imagine that they can’t be seen in their
motionless resolve. It is as though they pretend to be statues of themselves, hoping
to rest unnoticed, which makes the endeavour even more outlandish. In this way,
moths engage in a mimetic activity of subterfuge. To construct objects like these
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insects with bits and pieces of scrap material brings life into inanimate stuff
precisely because they are static their perfect stillness and posturing now
becoming the sculpture’s animating feature. Sheer good fortune brought the
image of a moth to mind when first regarding that piece of badly cut timber,
which conveys the marvel of transference through a mimetic act. Such a
transference references the traditions of static, stand-alone sculpture, where the
deficit of sculpture’s defining immovability, its stationary paralysis, becomes its
profit and charm. The moths’ mimesis not only relies on superficial similarity, but
also on behavioural mimicry. Looking at these works, one imagines that they
could suddenly vanish in the blink of an eye.
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